Original text by Matthias Deeg
In the second article of this series, SySS IT security expert Matthias Deeg presents security vulnerabilities found in another crypto USB flash drive with AES hardware encryption.
In the second part of this blog series, the research results concerning the secure USB flash drive Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD shown in the following Figures are presented.
The Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD is a USB drive with AES 256-bit hardware encryption and a built-in fingerprint sensor for unlocking the device with previously registered fingerprints.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows:
The AES 256-bit Hardware Encryption seamlessly encrypts all data on the drive in real-time. The drive is compliant with GDPR requirements as 100% of the drive is securely encrypted. The built-in fingerprint recognition system allows access for up to eight authorised users and one administrator who can access the device via a password. The SSD does not store passwords in the computer or system’s volatile memory making it far more secure than software encryption.
The used test methodology regarding this research project, the considered attack surface and attack scenarios, and the desired security properties expected in a secure USB flash drive were already described in the first part of this article series.
When analyzing a hardware device like a secure USB flash drive, the first thing to do is taking a closer look at the hardware design. By opening the case of the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD, its printed circuit board (PCB) can be removed. The following figure shows the front side of the PCB and the used SSD with an M.2 form factor.
Here, we can already see the first three main components of this device:
- NAND flash memory chips
- a memory controller (Maxio MAS0902A-B2C)
- a SPI flash memory chip (XT25F01D)
On the back side of the PCB, the following further three main components can be found:
- a USB-to-SATA bridge controller (INIC-3637EN)
- a fingerprint sensor controller (INIC-3782N)
- a fingerprint sensor
The Maxio memory controller and the NAND flash memory chips are part of an SSD in M.2 form factor. This SSD can be read and written using another SSD enclosure supporting this form factor which was very useful for different security tests.
Just like the Verbatim Keypad Secure covered in the first part of this article series, the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSDcontains a SATA SSD with an M.2 form factor which can be used in another compatible SSD enclosure. Thus, analyzing the actually stored data of this secure USB flash drive was also rather easy.
By having a closer look at the encrypted data, obvious patters could be seen, as the following hexdump illustrates:
# hexdump -C /dev/sda 00000000 7c a1 eb 7d 4e 39 1e b1 9b c8 c6 86 7d f3 dd 70 ||..}N9......}..p| * 000001b0 99 e8 74 12 35 1f 1b 3b 77 12 37 6b 82 36 87 cf |..t.5..;w.7k.6..| 000001c0 fa bf 99 9e 98 f7 ba 96 ba c6 46 3a e5 bc 15 55 |..........F:...U| 000001d0 7c a1 eb 7d 4e 39 1e b1 9b c8 c6 86 7d f3 dd 70 ||..}N9......}..p| * 000001f0 92 78 15 87 cd 83 76 30 56 dd 00 1e f2 b3 32 84 |.x....v0V.....2.| 00000200 7c a1 eb 7d 4e 39 1e b1 9b c8 c6 86 7d f3 dd 70 ||..}N9......}..p| * 00100000 1e c0 fa 24 17 d9 4b 72 89 44 20 3b e4 56 99 32 |...$..Kr.D ;.V.2| 00100010 d8 65 93 7c 37 aa 8f 59 5e ec f1 e7 e6 9b de 9e |.e.|7..Y^.......| [...]
Seeing such repeating byte sequences in encrypted data is not a good sign, as we already know from part one of this series.
By writing known byte patterns to an unlocked device, it could be confirmed that the same 16 bytes of plaintext always result in the same 16 bytes of ciphertext. This looks like a block cipher encryption with 16 byte long blocks using Electronic Codebook (ECB)mode was used, for example AES-256-ECB.
For some data, the lack of the cryptographic property called diffusion, which this operation mode has, can leak sensitive information even in encrypted data. A famous example for illustrating this issue is a bitmap image of Tux, the Linux penguin, and its ECB encrypted data shown in the following Figure.
This found security issue was reported in the course of our responsible disclosure program via the security advisory SYSS-2022-010 and was assigned the CVE ID CVE-2022-28382.
The SPI flash memory chip (XT25F01D) of the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD contains the firmware for the USB-to-SATA bridge controller Initio INIC-3637EN. The content of this SPI flash memory chip could be extracted using the universal programmer XGecu T56.
When analyzing the firmware, it could be found out that the firmware validation only consists of a simple CRC-16 check using XMODEM CRC-16. Thus, an attacker is able to store malicious firmware code for the INIC-3637EN with a correct checksum on the used SPI flash memory chip.
For updating modified firmware images, a simple Python tool was developed that fixes the required CRC-16, as the following output exemplarily shows.
$ python update-firmaware.py firmware_hacked.bin Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD Firmware Updater v0.1 - Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH (c) 2022 [*] Computed CRC-16 (0x7087) does not match stored CRC-16 (0x48EE). [*] Successfully updated firmware file
Thus, an attacker is able to store malicious firmware code for the INIC-3637EN with a correct checksum on the used SPI flash memory chip (XT25F01D), which then gets successfully executed by the USB-to-SATA bridge controller. For instance, this security vulnerability could be exploited in a so-called supply chain attack when the device is still on its way to its legitimate user.
An attacker with temporary physical access during the supply could program a modified firmware on the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD, which always uses an attacker-controlled AES key for the data encryption, for example. If the attacker later on gains access to the used USB drive, he can simply decrypt all contained user data.
This found security issue concerning the insufficient firmware validation, which allows an attacker to store malicious firmware code for the USB-to-SATA bridge controller on the USB drive, was reported in the course of our responsible disclosure program via the security advisory SYSS-2022-011 and was assigned the CVE ID CVE-2022-28383.
The hardware design of the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD allowed for sniffing the serial communication between the fingerprint sensor controller (INIC-3782N) and the USB-to-SATA bridge controller (INIC-3637EN).
The following Figure exemplarily shows exchanged data when unlocking the device with a correct fingerprint. The actual communication is bidirectional and different data packets are exchanged during an unlocking process.
In the course of this research project, no further time was spent to analyze the used proprietary protocol between the fingerprint sensor controller and the USB-to-SATA bridge controller, as a simpler way could be found to attack this device, which is described in the next section.
The Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD supports the following two user authentication methods:
- Biometric authentication via fingerprint
- Password-based authentication
For the biometric authentication, a fingerprint sensor and a specific microcontroller (INIC-3782N) are used. Unfortunately, no public information about the INIC-3782N could be found, like data sheets or programming manuals.
For the registration of fingerprints, a client software (available for Windows or macOS) is used. The client software also supports a password-based authentication for accessing the administrative features and unlocking the secure disk partition containing the user data. The following Figure shows the login dialog of the provided client software for Windows.
The client software for Windows and macOS is provided on an emulated CD-ROM drive of the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD, as the following Figure exemplarily illustrates.
During this research project, only the Windows software in form of the executable
Fortunately, the Windows client software is very analysis-friendly, as meaningful symbol names are present in the executable, for example concerning the used AES encryption for protecting the USB communication.
The following Figure shows the AES (Rijndael) functions found in the Windows executable
Here, especially the two functions named
Furthermore, runtime analyses of the Windows client software using a software debugger like x64dbg could be performed without any issues. And in doing so, it was possible to analyze the AES-encrypted USB communication in cleartext, as the following Figure with a decrypted response from the USB flash drive illustrates.
For securing the USB communication, AES with a hard-coded cryptographic key is used.
When analyzing the USB communication between the client software and the USB storage device, a very interesting and concerning observation was made. That is, before the login dialog with the password-based authentication is shown, there was already some USB device communication with sensitive data. And this sensitive data was nothing less than the currently set password for the administrative access.
The following Figure shows the corresponding decrypted USB device response with the current administrator password
Thus, by accessing the decrypted USB communication of this specific IOCTL command, for instance using a software debugger as illustrated in the previous Figure, an attacker can instantly retrieve the correct plaintext password and thus unlock the device in order to gain unauthorized access to its stored user data.
In order to simplify the password retrieval process, a software tool named
This found security vulnerability was reported in the course of our responsible disclosure program via the security advisory SYSS-2022-009 with the assigned CVE ID CVE-2022-28387.
You can also find a demonstration of this attack in our SySS PoC video Hacking Yet Another Secure USB Flash Drive.
As described previously, the client software for administrative purposes is provided on an emulated CD-ROM drive. As my analysis showed, the content of this emulated CD-ROM drive is stored as an ISO-9660 image in the hidden sectors of the USB drive, that can only be accessed using special IOCTL commands, or when installing the drive in an external enclosure.
# fdisk -l /dev/sda Disk /dev/sda: 476.92 GiB, 512092012032 bytes, 1000179711 sectors Disk model: Portable Drive Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes Disklabel type: dos Disk identifier: 0xbfc4b04e Device Boot Start End Sectors Size Id Type /dev/sda1 2048 1000171517 1000169470 476.9G c W95 FAT32 (LBA)
# fdisk -l /dev/sda Disk /dev/sda: 476.94 GiB, 512110190592 bytes, 1000215216 sectors Disk model: RTL9210B NVME Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
And in those 35505 hidden sectors concerning the tested 512 GB version of the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD, the ISO-9660 image with the content of the emulated CD-ROM drive is stored, as the following output illustrates.
# dd if=/dev/sda bs=512 skip=1000179711 of=cdrom.iso 35505+0 records in 35505+0 records out 18178560 bytes (18 MB, 17 MiB) copied, 0.269529 s, 67.4 MB/s # file cdrom.iso cdrom.iso: ISO 9660 CD-ROM filesystem data 'VERBATIMSECURE'
By manipulating this ISO-9660 image or replacing it with another one, an attacker is able to store malicious software on the emulated CD-ROM drive. This malicious software may get executed by an unsuspecting victim when using the device at a later point in time.
The following Figure exemplarily shows what an emulated CD-ROM drive manipulated by an attacker containing malware my look like.
The following output exemplarily shows how a hacked ISO-9660 was generated for testing this attack vector.
# mkisofs -o hacked.iso -J -R -V "VerbatimSecure" ./content # dd if=hacked.iso of=/dev/sda bs=512 seek=1000179711 25980+0 records in 25980+0 records out 13301760 bytes (13 MB, 13 MiB) copied, 1.3561 s, 9.8 MB/s
As a thought experiment, this security issue concerning the data authenticity of the ISO-9660 image for the emulated CD-ROM partition could be exploited in an attack scenario one could call The Poor Hacker’s Not Targeted Supply Chain Attack which consists of the following steps:
- Buy vulnerable devices in online shops
- Modify bought devices by adding malware
- Return modified devices to vendors
- Hope that returned devices are resold and not destroyed
- Wait for potential victims to buy and use the modified devices
This found security issue was reported in the course of our responsible disclosure program via the security advisory SYSS-2022-013 with the assigned CVE ID CVE-2022-28385.
In this article, the research results leading to four different security vulnerabilities concerning the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD listed in the following Table were presented.
|Product||Vulnerability Type||SySS ID||CVE ID|
|Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD||Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation (CWE-1240)||SYSS-2022-009||CVE-2022-28387|
|Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD||Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation (CWE-1240)||SYSS-2022-010||CVE-2022-28382|
|Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD||Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware (CWE-1326)||SYSS-2022-011||CVE-2022-28383|
|Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD||Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (CWE-345)||SYSS-2022-013||CVE-2022-28385|
Again, these results show, that new portable storage devices with old security issues are still produced and sold today.